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ARTICLE
The Proliferation of Men: 
Markets, Property, and 
Seizure in Jordan
Geoffrey Fitzgibbon Hughes
London School of Economics
ABSTRACT
Spurred on by massive influxes of Palestinian refugees in previous de-
cades, the 1970s and 1980s were marked by acute struggles over land and 
housing in Jordan. This article places those struggles within the context of 
a historical look at property in Jordan spanning from the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire to more recent waves of refugees from Syria and Iraq. 
Drawing on recent research in the social studies of finance and feminist 
substantivist critiques of “the economy,” I argue for more attention to the 
role of violence and war in the formation of markets and property regimes. 
Moving between a World Bank squatter settlement standardization pro-
gram and interviews with contemporary planners, speculators, homeown-
ers, and construction workers, I argue that the sublimation of violent con-
testation over property has required subtle but important transformations 
in gender norms that privilege new strategies of accumulation. Yet many of 
my interlocutors insist that this novel “proliferation of wealth” remains sub-
ordinate to the role of large agnatic kin groups in the communal defense 
of land (“the proliferation of men”). Ongoing struggles between financiers, 
agnatic kin groups, and the Jordanian state illustrate the ways in which 
seizure is key to the work of market formation. [Keywords: Infrastructure, 
squatter settlements, settler colonialism, violence, kinship, masculinity]
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The first time I heard the proverb ‘izwat ar-rijāl aḥsan min ‘izwat al-māl (the proliferation of men is better than the proliferation of wealth), I 
was talking to my friend Abu Mahmud about his life story. Over 80, he was 
about five feet tall with a long bushy white beard and kind eyes. We talked 
about his family: his nine sons and their various jobs, mostly in security 
services. As we sat on the porch, he gestured down the winding road to 
their respective houses. He had helped build dwellings for all of them in 
the neighborhood so that they would always be nearby. He told me about 
how the whole settlement—now a dense concrete honeycomb—had 
started decades ago with three men: his Jordanian Bedouin father along 
with two men who were fleeing Palestine. Explaining how he had earned 
the money to build these houses, Abu spoke of his work in construction 
and the shift from goat hair tents woven by women to concrete houses 
built with male wealth and labor. He reminisced about the various families 
whose houses he had built, displaying his pride in a lifetime of hard work. 
At one point, he took my hand and placed it on his shoulder so I could 
feel the deep groove formed by decades of carrying things on his back. 
He emphasized to me that he was a simple, God-fearing man who was 
Figure 1: A map of Jordan and its annual rainfall, based on data from Hijmans. 
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at peace with his place in the world, viewing his family and its prolifera-
tion of men as his greatest accomplishment. As far as Abu Mahmud was 
concerned, this was as it should be.
This article traces the development of a giant, unplanned, and at times 
downright illegal construction project involving successive waves of refu-
gees who have sought shelter and legal recognition in Jordan. Jordan’s 
young capital, Amman, rises from the bedrock as limestone is ground up 
into concrete, pressed into cinderblocks, and built into houses that can 
be occupied by families dreaming of stable sanctuaries where they may 
safely dwell and prosper. As fathers seek to help build homes for their 
sons and grandsons, the network of concrete structures becomes denser 
and more interconnected: male kinship relations and community are ma-
terially instantiated in the built environment as each successive genera-
tion builds homes for the next generation around the existing structures. 
Yet the assemblage remains partial, incomplete, and vulnerable to sei-
zure. Unfinished structures litter the landscape, and aspirational concrete 
pillars jut out from people’s roofs. Those who build without government 
approval run the risk of being labeled “squatters” and having their homes 
demolished. Locals frustrate wealthy interlopers by making off with the 
plumbing in the night. 
The key to this story is the notion of seizure. Most notable here are the 
violent, overt seizures of large swaths of land by the Israeli state, which 
drove hundreds of thousands from the verdant lands west of the Jordan 
River to the far less forgiving steppe to the east. However, the focus of the 
article is the subsequent, much more subtle, and even sublimated forms 
of seizure that have been crucial to the attempts of those dispossessed 
and their sometimes reluctant hosts to reestablish some sense of normal-
cy. It is a privilege to be relieved of the work of seizure in this context. This 
includes the work that long-time East Bankers [Jordanians] have put into 
occupying their land and later selling it to their West Banker [Palestinian] 
“guests.” It also includes the Jordanian government’s ongoing attempts 
to claim such land for itself. At its most abstract, we find a massive World 
Bank infrastructure loan to the Jordanian government designed to fix such 
property relations once and for all and provide basic infrastructure to so-
called “squatters”—on the condition that those labeled as squatters repay 
the initial loan with interest. 
The notion of seizure, so central to early utopian socialist writings on mar-
ket formation and economy (cf. Proudhon 1994, Marx 1976), has tended to 
The Proliferation of Men: Markets, Property, and Seizure in Jordan
1084
fall out of more recent work on the social construction of markets (Callon 
1998, MacKenzie 2009, Miyazaki 2005). Ironically, despite these more re-
cent authors’ emphasis on the state’s role in market formation, one rarely 
finds the state fully exercising its hallmark repressive powers in their ac-
counts. However, by moving from cosmopolitan centers of accumulation 
and their relatively privileged denizens (Ho 2009, MacKenzie 2006, Zaloom 
2006) to more peripheral frontier zones, we can see how violently conflicting 
notions of value, ownership, and legitimate authority are harnessed to con-
stitute contemporary forms of property and market relations.1 Of course, 
the line between center and periphery today is often quite stark and abrupt. 
Some of the most notable urban political struggles in recent years in some 
of the world’s most supposedly advanced democracies and economies 
have involved highly profitable state initiatives of, on the one hand, “gray-
ing” (Yiftachel 2009) marginalized spaces and populations to render them 
illegal and, on the other hand, “legaliz[ing] the illegal” (Holston 2007:25). The 
Marxist geographer David Harvey (2003), writing about this apparent lacuna 
within contemporary social scientific literature in the era of gentrification, 
has suggested greater attention to “accumulation through dispossession” 
as a corrective. Drawing on the work of Rosa Luxemburg (2003), Harvey 
argues that the emphasis on an originary or “primitive” accumulation in the 
writings of Marx and many of his latter-day interpreters has distracted social 
scientists from focusing on the ways in which the demands of accumula-
tion constantly require the production of new frontiers that can be incorpo-
rated—anew—into capitalist production.2
To understand how these forms of what Bear et al. (2015) term “capture 
and conversion” function and how they are effaced, it is useful to return to 
the tradition in anthropology of feminist substantivist critiques of attempts 
to disembed “the economy” and constitute it as a discrete “social domain.” 
In Naturalizing Power, Sylvia Yanagisako and Carol Delaney critique this 
tendency to view “the quartet of kinship, economics, politics, and religion” 
as “basic building blocks of society” in favor of “read[ing] across these do-
mains” (1995:11–14). By doing so we learn that, for instance, “too many 
studies of women’s ‘domestic’ activities have disclosed that these have 
political as well as domestic consequences” (Yanagisako 1979:191). As we 
will see, the reverse is equally true: men’s supposedly political–jural activi-
ties often have important domestic ramifications. All too often these activi-
ties—whatever their “domain”—lead to the socially legitimated alienation 
of some people’s productive and reproductive capacities by some others. 
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However, the impressions that social actors (ethnographers included) 
derive from their experiences of such “domains” are unlike those asso-
ciated with what Yanagisako and Delaney (1995) term “explicit ideolo-
gies.” This is because direct experience itself seems to validate a close 
correspondence between the discrete social institutions one encounters 
and “hegemonic cultural distinctions.” Recognizing this form of reifica-
tion forces us to ask, “how culturally specific domains have been dialecti-
cally formed and transformed in relation with other cultural domains, how 
meanings migrate across domain boundaries, and how specific actions 
are multiply constituted” (1995:11–12). This is why it can be difficult for 
ethnographers to write simultaneously about both the peaceable “eco-
nomic” marketing of commodities and the violent “political” exclusion of 
other possible claimants that makes those “peaceable” market relations 
possible.3 Trade, barter, trickery, development, and construction inevita-
bly partake in broader logics of seizure. We cannot disembed such puta-
tively “economic” issues associated with property and market-formation 
from putatively “political” action based on coercive rationality. 
My interlocutors largely refused to treat landed property as what most 
would consider a purely “economic” phenomenon, often emphasizing 
what we might call its violent, political dimension (seizure) and their com-
plicity in it as men. In conversations about land, men like Abu Mahmud 
frame relations between men as vastly more important than relationships 
between things. Tellingly, Abu Mahmud would never explain to me who 
his father and friends had bought the land from—not that it was difficult to 
find out from our other neighbors. Instead, attempts at elicitation inevita-
bly caused him to launch into stories about the great, masculine exploits 
of his ancestors (“real men”) or, if pressed, he might exclaim in exaspera-
tion, min nās (from people). Of course, compared to the forced expulsion 
of the Palestinians from their homes and the invocation of eminent domain 
by the Jordanian state and global development experts, the attempts of 
Abu Mahmud and other Jordanians to simply dwell in the world with their 
families are strikingly benign and sentimental. Yet his valorization of the 
“proliferation of men” and his refusal to allow his ownership claims to be 
fully assimilated to the “economic” category of private, freehold property 
were compelling. 
This article narrates a particular struggle amongst agnatic kin groups, 
the Jordanian state, and transnationally situated financiers over the na-
ture and disposition of markets and property. To do so, it is necessary to 
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track backwards and forwards in time and space between government 
offices and the physical terrain upon which people have long staked their 
respective property claims. The first section introduces the deeper history 
of contestation over the “enclosure” of land by the state, those allied with 
it, and those opposed to it. The second section introduces “The Shelter 
Unit” and their archives: remnants of a World Bank squatter settlement 
standardization initiative that sought to constitute and rationalize a na-
tional housing market in Jordan. The next section contrasts the idea of 
ownership that emerged from the Shelter Unit’s efforts with those that had 
come before, highlighting its deeply individuated notion of ownership. The 
fourth and fifth sections address how lands in the wastelands that were 
once “free” could be reinvented, with the help of the World Bank, their 
knowledge-production, and their infrastructure loans, as a source of value 
for global commodity markets through techniques of “squatter settlement 
standardization.” Throughout this process, seizure has remained key to 
the various attempts of different groups to press their property claims and 
further their respective infrastructure projects.
Enclosures
The following account draws on a combination of oral historical research, 
participant observation, and archival research in Jordan. Archives at the 
Housing and Urban Development Corporation, one of the main institu-
tions that emerged from the implementation of the World Bank’s squat-
ter settlement standardization program, held a wealth of reports from the 
United Nations, the World Bank, the Housing Corporation, the Ministry 
of Planning, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs, and the Urban 
Development Department. All of these sources reflect traces of a sensibil-
ity that transcends the particularities of any specific historical legal prop-
erty regime: unimproved steppe land is there for the taking and land rights 
are a function of one’s physical, material engagement with the land and a 
willingness to defend one’s claim. Even at the time of research, outsiders 
who bought land in the arable zone where legal questions of ownership 
were supposedly settled decades ago—almost always wealthy urbanites 
building fīlas (villas)—invested enough money in staking a physical claim 
to their new property to suggest a widespread lack of faith in the ade-
quacy of legal title alone. In fact, to what degree any particular property 
regime has ever functioned de facto or de jure in what is now Jordan is 
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a matter of debate. Oral historical and journalistic accounts of the post-
Ottoman era are full of examples of land transfers that were not recorded 
in government-issued land deeds (sanads). To this day, the privatization 
and commoditization of land in Jordan remains a partial—if increasingly 
successful—project, which the World Bank, United Nations, and Housing 
Corporation continue to promote with mixed results.
Michael Fischbach’s (2000) study of the documentary evidence con-
cerning land rights in the 19th and 20th centuries describes an Ottoman 
land regime4 in which very little land outside of urban areas was private, 
freehold land (mulkī) and the vast majority of land was the property of the 
state (mīrī). Such land was there to be improved and used by subjects in re-
turn for taxes. By working the land, Ottoman subjects gained rights to the 
fruits of the land (taṣarrif, or usufruct), but the “neck” (al-ruqba, or ultimate 
ownership) continued to reside with the state and served as the basis for 
taxation. Fischbach (2000) argues that it was with the onset of British rule 
that property relations in Jordan’s agricultural regions really started to shift 
towards a regime of private, freehold land tenure. He claims that, for the 
British, there were “two fundamental assumptions. The first was that all 
land was owned by someone. The second was that land should be man-
aged efficiently in order to maximize its productive potential” (2000:79). 
The cadastral surveys the British conducted in the wake of their conquest 
of the Ottoman Empire sought to institutionalize private property with a 
precision that had never been attempted before.5 All cultivated land was 
to be assigned by the state to individuals—even if the ownership of un-
cultivated land remained ambiguous. Practically speaking, this meant that 
the state made a point of registering the fertile land near the Jordan Valley 
to individuals while quietly claiming everything else for itself—a decision 
that would later prove untenable.
The process through which interlopers secured their newly acquired 
property was one of enclosure (cf. Polanyi 1944), and followed a formu-
laic pattern. The new owner would start by erecting a fence around the 
parcel. At times, these fences could appear rather symbolic: chicken wire 
or something consciously resembling the pre-modern boundary walls that 
dot the landscape in the Jordan Valley and its hinterland. These days, fenc-
es built by wealthy interlopers tend to be over two meters tall. In contrast, 
people with ties to the area inevitably built the other way around: build-
ing the house first and then worrying about demarcating boundaries and 
shielding the house from view to conform to community norms of modesty. 
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Having built a fence, however, newcomers would often plant some sort 
of crop within the enclosure and leave it otherwise vacant for years. In 
the arable zone west of Amman, this led to a common sight of small plots 
of wheat or baby olive trees sitting behind massive fences made of ei-
ther concrete faced with cut stone or chain link—often topped with barbed 
wire. The wealthiest would bring in grown fruit trees,6 hire a migrant laborer 
from Egypt or Syria to look after them, and then hire a second man (one 
with deep roots in the community) to look after the estate and the migrant 
laborer. All of these behaviors were readily recognized by local residents 
(old-timers and newcomers alike) as strategies for staking a claim to own-
ership that ran orthogonal to the state-backed regime of land registration. 
Despite this widespread and ongoing lack of faith in the regime of land 
registration, the 1970s and 1980s constituted a crucial time period for the 
future of housing in Jordan during which large swaths of tribally controlled 
land were transformed into partible commodities that could be bought, 
sold, and circulated due to a sophisticated regime of registration, zoning 
and infrastructure provision. This process of commoditization7 (Appadurai 
1988) involved the creation of a very specific sort of regime of value that 
was catalyzed by an international group of planners8 known as “the Shelter 
Unit” who sought to fix what they perceived as Jordan’s housing problem 
by establishing an efficient housing market. To the degree that they suc-
ceeded in using ongoing political tensions between Palestinian refugees, 
the residents of the East Bank, and the government to create enough af-
fordable, state-certified properties to constitute a housing market, they 
created a new regime of value. The kind of fluid, efficient housing market 
they envisioned could have far-reaching implications for the relationship 
between men, their families, their agnatic kin groups, and the state. What 
seems to have emerged, though, is a much messier compromise among a 
range of competing regimes of value. 
The Shelter Unit
The Jordan of the development reports stored at the Housing Corporation 
would be almost unrecognizable to most Jordanians. As Michael Goldman 
(2005) makes clear in his ethnography of the World Bank, Imperial Nature, 
knowledge production at the organization is largely beholden to the require-
ments of providing global financial markets with guaranteed, high-yield, 
credit-based investments. The Bank has neither the time nor the resources 
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to focus on anything other than generating returns for its investors in the 
most efficient way possible. Thus, major divergences between Bank re-
ports and anything that local people might identify as “reality” should not 
be completely surprising. For example, where oral historical accounts of 
land tenure in Jordan were largely dominated by a narrative that empha-
sized the tensions between Palestinian refugees and their Jordanian hosts, 
the country’s two World Bank-financed National Housing Strategies (from 
1987 and 1996 respectively) went out of their way to avoid the contro-
versy9—while making proposals that would ultimately transform the rela-
tionship between the two groups. This is exactly what Goldman’s account 
of higher-level decision-making processes at the Bank would predict. It 
is also deeply consonant with James Ferguson’s (1994) widely respected 
study of World Bank development discourse in Lesotho in the 1980s, The 
Anti-Politics Machine. Of course, with the exception of their common prox-
imity to a settler colony, there is little reason why events in the 1970s and 
1980s in Lesotho should have any particular bearing on events in Jordan. 
The countries are vastly different and separated by thousands of miles, but 
this would not be particularly apparent from the reports. In keeping with 
Goldman’s observations about knowledge production at the Bank a de-
cade later, the development programs essentially employ the same frame-
work no matter where they are applied. This implies there is both congruity 
between the Jordanian reports and their counterparts across the globe and 
incongruity between the Jordanian reports and the oral historical evidence. 
This encourages us to interpret such reports as a reflection of the sensibili-
ties of transnationally situated planners rather than a straightforward and 
authoritative account of historical events in a given locale.
As Goldman and Ferguson argue, it is beside the point that these re-
ports inevitably turn out to be internally inconsistent and factually inaccu-
rate. To quote Ferguson, “the statistics are wrong, but always wrong in the 
same way; the conceptions are fanciful, but it is always the same fantasy” 
(1994:55). The 1986 National Housing Strategy, prepared by the Shelter 
Unit in concert with a consultancy called Planning and Development 
Collaborative International (PADCO), is typical. In keeping with the liber-
alizing, “small government” ethos of the Reagan–Thatcher era, the strat-
egy proposal cautioned against housing projects and suggested that “the 
preferred strategy relies primarily on the private sector and, in particular, 
the individual, owner-builder housing path to achieve targets in both to-
tal national housing production and production appropriate for all income 
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groups” (Shelter Unit 1987a:24). However, once one finished the executive 
summaries and waded into the next 23 volumes, the report was padded 
with all sorts of perceptive work by indigenous planners—much of which 
completely contradicted the top-line findings of the report. For instance, 
the same report that conceptualizes housing as the work of “individual 
owner–builders” later reproduces a model (in Volume 7) from the Urban 
Development Department that treats housing as the work of kin-based 
collectivities centered around apical male ancestors (like Abu Mahmud) 
working and living together. The chart includes five columns, listing the age 
of the household, the age of the head of household, “family milestone[s]” 
(when the sons are born, start work, and get married), the “number of work-
ers in basic household,” and “number of households” (see Figure 2).
Ferguson focuses on the ways in which World Bank reports, as the 
gold standard of “development” discourse, inevitably seek to depoliticize 
problems by reframing them as technical challenges which can be met 
through particular “projects” consisting of supposedly technical solutions: 
“roads, markets, and credit” (Ferguson 1994:71). This overwhelming fo-
cus on the technocratic and apolitical aspects of development helps to 
stifle discussion about the role of labor, property, and gender in promoting 
and sustaining existing formations of political power. These more conten-
tious questions are shunted into the “private” realm of the household and, 
oddly enough, the market as well. Particularly, by pretending that property 
relationships are a concern of the household and the market and outside 
of the government’s “public” purview (something any Palestinian, Syrian, 
or Iraqi refugee would have some opinions about), these organizations 
can help rule out certain kinds of political contestation by stipulating that 
people submit to putatively apolitical “market” forces. 
Moreover, should this demand that people submit to such market forc-
es prove insufficient, there is always the option of casting such questions 
aside even more forcefully through recourse to ecological explanations 
that locate the source of certain people’s deprivation within “Nature” it-
self. This actually appears to be a pattern in World Bank reports dealing 
Figure 2: The same World Bank sponsored Housing Strategy that explained 
Jordanian building practices as the work of “individual owner–builders” also 
included a model designed by indigenous planners that explained them as the 
work of multi-generational households. The research of the indigenous planners, 
consistently the most plausible contained in the document, was largely not 
integrated into the overall findings.
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Year
Age of 
Head Family Milestone
Numbers of Workers in 
Basic Basic Household
(Shelter Unit 1987b:8)
Number of  
Households
1 25 Household head marries  and forms household 1 1
2 26 Birth of first son 1 1
3 27 1 1
4 28 1 1
5 29 Birth of second son 1 1
6 30 1 1
7 31 1 1
8 32 Birth of third son 1 1
9 33 1 1
10 34 1 1
11 35 Birth of last son 1 1
12 36 1 1
13 37 1 1
14 38 1 1
15 39 1 1
16 40 1 1
17 41 1 1
18 42 1 1
19 43 First son starts work 2 1
20 44 2 1
21 45 2 1
22 46 Second son starts work 3 1
23 47 3 1
24 48 3 1
25 49 Third son starts work 4 1
26 50 4 1
27 51 First son marries 3 2
28 52 Last son starts work 4 2
29 53 4 2
30 54 Second son marries 3 3
31 55 3 3
32 56 3 3
33 57 Third son marries 2 4
34 58 2 4
35 59 2 4
36 60 Fourth son marries 1 5
37 61 Household head retires 0 5
38 62 0 5
39 63 0 5
Figure 2: Development of a Hypothetical Family
Assumptions: Males marry at age 25, and enter labor force at age 17. Mature family contains 4 sons with 
an average interval of 3 years between male births.
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with contexts that other analysts might term “settler colonialism.” In de-
velopment reports about Jordan and Lesotho, vast differences in geogra-
phy and environment melt away as a common “ecological” explanation 
for privation is put forward: basically, too many people on too little ar-
able land. This is despite the fact that, as Ferguson points out, everyone 
would agree that it would be absurd to give an ecological account of why 
the Bronx is poor in relationship to Manhattan. Yet ecological accounts 
abound when discussing Jordan or Lesotho. The fact that the residents 
have been pushed off of the more desirable land and barred from using it 
is treated as incidental.
If these reports make dubious claims to provide historical accounts of 
the recent past, they can nonetheless be studied as indexical traces of 
the conflicts over housing that have defined Jordan since the 1970s.10 In 
what follows, it is absolutely essential that we understand what Ferguson 
calls “the complex relationship between the intentionality of planning and 
the strategic intelligibility of outcomes” (1994:20–21). The “side effects” 
of supposedly unsuccessful social engineering projects with seemingly 
absurd assumptions often extend state power and markets in ways that 
are all the more difficult to thwart because there is no longer any obvi-
ous culprit. The following section will focus on how a more diverse set of 
actors have worked together to use this notion of the “individual owner-
builder” and the “private sector” to help land and housing infrastructure 
achieve their current “commodity candidacy” (Appadurai 1988:15)—
which is by no means a given. For much of Jordan’s recent history, land 
has proved difficult to buy and sell, remaining largely tied up with mar-
riage exchanges and warfare. 
Inventing the Individual Owner-Builder
A particular ad hoc workgroup of planners known as “the Shelter Unit,” 
in their search for a “Hedonic Index” that would quantify the value of ev-
ery constituent part of the home, created the powerful (if largely fictitious) 
figure of the “individual owner–builder” who later became the imagined 
beneficiary of a generation of housing policy. The erasure of the house-
hold as a living, hybrid assemblage of people, labor, property relations, 
and space and its substitution with the abstracted individual owner-build-
er is in keeping with “the conceptual polarity of individualized persons 
and commoditized things” (Appadurai 1988:64). In Appadurai (1988) and 
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Kopytoff’s (1988) processual framework of commoditization and singular-
ization, anything can achieve “commodity candidacy.” The issue is what 
objects take on these characteristics, under what circumstances, and for 
how long. 
The oral historical register is replete with stories that describe the odd 
“paths and divergences” through which various things (particularly land) 
became commodities long before the “era of government” in the 1920s 
and the later initiatives of development organizations. I will return to this 
theme in the following section, but for now, one example related to me by 
my friend Harun about the land-dealing antics of his neighbors’ ancestors 
will suffice: 
Muath’s grandfather, Ahmed, had a racing horse he would take 
to weddings and circumcisions back in the days when they had 
games and races. It was a beautiful horse and he would always win. 
Suleiman’s uncle, Saleem, asked to buy the horse but Ahmed was 
clever. He said he wouldn’t think of selling it. He said, “This is a racing 
horse” and “Look how beautiful it is.” Then Saleem’s brother started 
talking to Ahmed about buying it. Ahmed was clever, though. He 
knew it was really the brother asking. So he kept saying he wouldn’t 
sell it. Finally, Ahmed sold the horse to the man for 32 dunum of land 
[32,000 square meters]. That’s all the land west of the village! The 
horse died in the snow that winter but in the end, Ahmed had to sell 
[all of the land] because of girls.
Confused, I said, “What?” He responded, “Well, in those days, if you didn’t 
have any money, you could give land as bridewealth. So he had a lot of 
sons and nephews and every time he wanted to marry one, he would give 
away some of his land to her father until he had almost none left.” Harun’s 
story was meant as an object lesson in shifting regimes of value and, of 
course, as a none-too-subtle way of impugning the neighbors as being, by 
turns, crafty yet also gullible. The story is part of a moralizing aspect of the 
genre of oral history that recounts how land, which would now be incred-
ibly valuable, was appropriated via cunning rather than right—only to be 
lost before the trickster figure could derive any real benefit. 
While Harun’s account was intended to highlight the naïveté and cupid-
ity of his neighbors, it also reveals that this is not some pre-commodity age 
of innocence. Land could be bartered with none of the romanticized ideals 
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often imputed to gift exchange. People were perfectly ready to use every 
bit of cunning to swindle their neighbors—even if they never got the op-
portunity to become millionaires with the help of the turn of the 21st century 
surge in land values. Timing is everything here.11 The story only works as 
an exercise in 20/20 hindsight, with Saleem judged as particularly stupid 
for squandering his family patrimony on a short-lived horse and Ahmed 
judged as particularly crafty for initially making off with the land in this ill-
conceived transaction. Ahmed’s subsequent conversion of the property 
into bridewealth, while completely subscribing to an ethos that valorizes 
the proliferation of men, is retrospectively denigrated by his neighbors be-
cause of the immense price the land in question would now fetch.
As the story makes clear, land was not the same kind of commodity that 
it is now. Here, the line between singular people and commoditized things 
is blurred. Land and livestock (much like people) are viewed as a bundle of 
overlapping rights and responsibilities (cf. Strathern 1985, Weiner 1992). 
Land won through Ahmed’s cunning very quickly and inexorably passes 
to his agnates and then the families of their respective wives—with very 
little sense that a man like Ahmed could hope to do anything to stop it. 
This is all the more true when discussing other people’s familial relations. 
Ownership is perhaps an anachronistic concept here. There is no recourse 
to the state to challenge other claims: merely the opportunity to defend 
various rights against other takers.
This form of right (ḥaq) should not be confused with that guaranteed 
by states. This is rather the form of “right” asserted and upheld through 
the older form of traditional jurisprudence centered on the ability of male 
agnatic kin groupings to police the behavior of their own agnates lest they 
open themselves up to retaliation from rival groups.12 It is true that, even 
within such a system, Ahmed (like so many others in these stories) is able 
to take control of property using nothing more than a soon-to-be dead 
horse as pretext. Ironically though, just as Ahmed appropriates the land 
via cunning against this backdrop of often violent competition among ag-
natic kin groupings, it simply slips through his fingers as his various family 
members make all manner of claims on that land before it can become 
the kind of state-protected private freehold property that would now earn 
Ahmed and his descendents a small fortune. 
The World Bank would try to construct a very different regime of val-
ue called a Hedonic Index: an exercise in market research that seeks to 
understand individuals (who independently control things that can be 
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conceptualized as private freehold property) in relationship to those things 
via a precise numerical scale of value. It would be easy to dismiss the 
exercise as pointless (people could relate horses to land in quantitative 
terms decades before the World Bank showed up). The numerical values 
themselves are a distraction: even the Shelter Unit did not fully believe 
the results. At times, the authors of the report seem utterly convinced that 
the respondents were systematically lying to them in hopes of gaining as-
sistance.13 It was the far broader conceptual work of singularization and 
commoditization, summed up on the figure of the individual owner-builder 
that was truly transformative. 
Knowledge practices like surveys and hedonic indices are essential to 
the construction and maintenance of infrastructure. As Donald MacKenzie 
argues in his “Ten Precepts for the Social Studies of Finance,” facts mat-
ter and, more importantly, “facts are made: by experiment, by intellectual 
work, and by observation that is normally technologically mediated and 
typically is disciplined and goal-oriented rather than haphazard” (2009:9). 
However, the cognitive infrastructure of even the most powerful and well-
financed institutions like the World Bank are rarely sufficient to dictate the 
unfolding of events. To be sure, their economic models are often “perfor-
mative,” shaping and formatting as much as they observe. However, in 
Jordan their models soon came into conflict with competing infrastruc-
tures: namely those of families more interested in finding stable sanctuary 
for themselves and their progeny (the proliferation of men) than the intrica-
cies of land tenure and housing markets (the proliferation of wealth). 
As the World Bank worked to house a rapidly sedentarizing Bedouin 
population and a large population of displaced Palestinians, they formu-
lated the problem as one of creating an efficient housing market, which 
would provide the credit necessary to meet demand. Yet land and housing 
were anything but the freely circulating commodities that the Bank as-
sumed they were dealing with. Likewise, people were not the fixed, au-
tonomous, and grounded (that is singular) “individual owner-builders” that 
the Bank assumed they were dealing with. With many people who loathe 
the idea of moving away from their families or using land as collateral 
(not just due to Islamic strictures around moneylending, but also familial 
disapprobation), the dream of an efficient, frictionless housing market re-
mained a fantasy. To make matters worse, the Shelter Unit and its backers 
at the World Bank found themselves dealing with the fact that consider-
able amounts of marginal communal (mushā‘) land claimed by a large tribe 
The Proliferation of Men: Markets, Property, and Seizure in Jordan
1096
known as the Bani Hasan were sitting next to rapidly growing refugee 
camps. This was allowing these groups to do an end-run around the gov-
ernment’s property registration system and the banking sector, making 
complex, inscrutable arrangements amongst themselves instead. 
As long as property rights were in question, people would be forced 
to see property through the lens of communal defense. The proverb, “the 
proliferation of men is better than the proliferation of wealth” epitomizes 
this sensibility that wealth is worthless without people to defend it. An or-
ganization that asks accused squatters and people who see themselves as 
inhabiting ancestral lands to put a monetary value on their homes may at 
first appear to be getting ahead of itself. Nonetheless, the Shelter Unit and 
its backers still exerted an outsized effect on a key aspect of Jordanian-
Palestinian relations by getting deeply involved in the conjoined tasks of 
land registration and infrastructure provision. In fact, they tacitly participat-
ed in the legitimation of certain Palestinian refugees’ efforts to permanently 
settle in Jordan—all while generating profits for global financial markets as 
long as these refugees continued to repay the loans to the Bank as a condi-
tion of their continued residency in the homes that they had built. 
“Land Was Free”
There could not be a “proper” housing market until land had become a 
different kind of commodity—specifically one that could be defended as 
property by an individual with recourse to the repressive apparatus of 
the state. In other words, it had to become private property. Much of this 
contestation in the western part of Jordan near the Jordan Valley hap-
pened in the 1930s when the British performed a cadastral survey and 
registered agricultural lands. While both Ottoman law and local practice 
conferred property rights conditional on continued use and improvement 
of the land, the land near the valley received enough rainfall to ensure that 
someone would be regularly availing themselves of the land for agricul-
tural purposes. This, of course, was and is increasingly difficult the further 
east one travels. Traveling east on the road to Zarqa, the landscape shifts 
from green to brown. Out there, it was not even possible to farm the land 
for three consecutive years—the minimum time required to register land 
under the mushā‘ system, which outlived the Ottoman and British em-
pires and passed, largely unremarked upon, into Jordanian property law. 
However, with the post-independence explosion in the size of the state’s 
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bureaucracy (especially in the capital of Amman), the construction of a 
large military installation in neighboring Zarqa, and the influx of wave after 
wave of refugees, this land was transformed from wasteland into some of 
the most valuable real estate in the Middle East in a matter of decades. 
As Anne Marie Baylouny (2008) argues in the article “Militarizing 
Welfare,” men hailing from the East Bank (especially in rural areas) have 
been increasingly absorbed into the security services where they continue 
to act out a defensive role but now serve new masters: the state rather than 
their families. In return, they have been able to shore up their individualistic 
control of property through both the system of private property ownership 
and their differential access to cash (due to their government jobs). At the 
same time, foreign migrants have increasingly taken over more traditional 
forms of female labor in agriculture and animal husbandry, leaving women 
from particular class backgrounds increasingly confined to the home as the 
older rationales for their movement throughout the community have disap-
peared. For Bedouins in particular, housing has been transformed from 
women’s wealth (a goat hair tent woven by the family’s women) to men’s 
wealth: the concrete house built with the labor and money of primarily male 
family members. Meanwhile, communities of various refugee groups have 
tended to cluster in urban areas where most men take what jobs they can 
get in the private sector. The lucky ones work abroad and send back remit-
tances or, increasingly, administer investment projects backed by interna-
tional financial actors within Jordan. The imposition of an efficient security 
apparatus, in tandem with bureaucratization, changing forms of domestic 
architecture, and new property regimes has led to a reconfiguration of gen-
der roles. This reconfiguration modulates men’s defensive role and renders 
it increasingly problematic, but does not eliminate it. 
The notion of seizure remains important here. In the moralizing aspect 
of the genre of stories about land, there is always a heavy taint of illegiti-
macy—especially where money is involved. This is to be expected since 
shifts in property relations tended to track closely with social upheaval. 
New interlopers were disruptive.14 Yet, disruptions were inevitably recon-
ceptualized later in terms of the emergent Jordanian state in relationship 
to its geopolitical allies and competitors. The stories had a geographic as 
well as a moral logic. From the east came raiders and extortionists: this 
was a reference to the fact that, during the 1930s, certain Saudi tribes 
would decimate the herds of southern Jordanian Bedouins and then take 
cover underneath the British defensive umbrella.15 From the west came 
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swindlers and loansharks: useful villains for a nationalist rhetoric that 
claims “Jordan for Jordanians” to the exclusion of Palestinian refugees. 
This example from the moralizing aspect of the genre of oral historical ac-
counts of land sales is typical: 
I remember stories from those days in the past but not clearly. It’s like 
a dream to me. I grew up hearing about these things in the 1970s. So 
people would come from Palestine and people would buy all sorts of 
stuff with land. Dates, olive oil, ḥalāwa [a sugary sesame paste with 
questionable nutritional value], finely embroidered underwear…
After the ensuing uproar, he continued, somewhat more seriously:
Land back in those days was basically free (balāsh) and the people 
were hungry. People would die from hunger. So these traders would 
come from Palestine with dates, olive oil, preserves, and ḥalāwa. 
Imagine if you were dying of hunger and someone brought you a 
tank full of ḥalāwa. You’d be beside yourself, right? The [neighboring 
tribe] sold so much of their land for ḥalāwa.
Once again, in keeping with the moralizing aspect of the genre, it is always 
about other people and the narrative is driven by a combination of licen-
tiousness, venality, and cunning on all sides. 
The imputation of great cunning on the part of the Palestinian mer-
chants is consonant with a tendency within Jordanian nativism to see rural 
East Bankers as hospitable and naïve in relationship to the depredations 
of interloping Palestinian city-folk (Shryock 1997a, 1997b). Yet there were 
reasons for skepticism: what could a travelling merchant in possession of 
luxury goods who was operating beyond the reach of the state do when 
desperate locals wanted things they could not afford to pay for? But from 
the perspective of the East Bankers like Harun:
You see, these traders were like [a particularly notorious local figure 
who was part village head and part moneylender]. See, he had a 
store and he would lend [money] and not harvest [the debt] (yidayin 
wa ma yaḥsid ). Then he would wait for a bad year and ask for the 
money. They wouldn’t have anything to give him but their land. Isn’t 
that religiously forbidden (ḥarām)? But there was a Palestinian who 
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did this even more. His name was [so-and-so] Al-Nabulsi. He would 
let the [neighboring tribe] buy on credit and then suddenly he would 
ask for his money and take the land as payment. Isn’t that ḥarām? 
He ended up with 400 dunum among the [neighboring tribe]! He had 
three sons and they divided it between them. One of them was a 
drunk in Madaba who sold all of his, but the other two still have all 
of their shares. 
Based on generic conventions, it is certainly only a matter of time until 
some misfortune befalls the other two or, at the very least, some more 
of their descendants.16 But, of course, Al-Nabulsi and the village mon-
eylender (along with their descendants) would probably have to rank as 
some of the luckier traders in history. If they had tried to seize such lands 
in the absence of the state’s subsequent imposition of the current regime 
of private property, it would have been the best solution to their disagree-
ments with their customers, but they would not have reaped such outsized 
rewards. Like the thwarted trickster figure, Ahmed, they would have either 
watched as the land they had wrested control of was absorbed into the 
community as it was re-divided to cover all manner of social obligations 
or they would have simply been pushed off by someone more aggressive 
and with more local support.
Of Squatters and Chaotic Housing
Land is not necessarily valuable. What is the use of having dry, unpopulat-
ed space with no electricity, roads, or sewerage? There is a popular origin 
myth about the Bani Hassan (who will figure prominently in the following 
account), which tells that the people were hungry and thirsty and begged 
a man from the Bani Hassan to help them find water for their crops. He 
told them that he would find them water: his cow would walk until it found 
the nearest well. But in return, he would get all of the land between the 
spot on which he stood and that well. That, it is often said, is how the Bani 
Hassan came to own the most land in Jordan: the most land, perhaps, but 
also the most useless land. So imagine their delight when a city suddenly 
began to spring up around them after the waves of Palestinian refugees 
arrived. Then consider the sense of deep betrayal they must have experi-
enced when the government not only tried to stop them from selling their 
lands to the settlers, but actually challenged their ownership claims. This 
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struggle is at the center of Omar Razzaz’s (1991)17 Ph.D. dissertation Law, 
Urban Tenure, and Property Disputes in Contested Settlements: The Case 
of Jordan, which has come to be the definitive contemporaneous account 
of the Bani Hassan’s struggle with the Jordanian state. His account will help 
explain how the World Bank’s quest for efficient markets would have a pro-
found effect on the development of housing infrastructure east of Amman, 
bringing a close to an, at times, violent conflict between the state, longtime 
residents, and newcomers. The World Bank would effectively do this by 
taking out a loan and using it to provide legal title and some infrastructure 
to those occupying the land—so long as they repaid the loan.
Razzaz, like the World Bank Planners, was highly cognizant of the fact 
that it was the very undesirability of this land that made it so cheap and 
hence attractive for those aspiring to join the propertied middle class. As 
he notes, 90 percent of legally available residential property at the time 
was zoned for large upper-income plots (1994:16). Many of these plots 
could not be legally subdivided any smaller than 1,000 square meters. 
Meanwhile, the government had built Yajouz Road to connect the two cit-
ies of Amman and Zarqa, providing a transportation hook-up to a large 
expanse of arid steppe with questionable ownership status. This helped 
underwrite the massive expansion of the Jordanian middle class and a 
particular gendering of labor, property, and space. By the 1980s, the goat 
hair tent woven by women was a thing of the past and virtually every seg-
ment of Jordanian society sought permanent concrete houses built by 
men leveraging their access to the cash economy. Razzaz documents how 
the housing boom in Yajouz took the pressure off of the more legitimate 
housing market in other parts of the country, leading prices in Yajouz and 
elsewhere to converge by the end of the 1980s. Thus, even those with no 
stomach for the risks associated with squatting came to benefit from lower 
housing prices and greater liquidity in the market across the country that 
made permanent concrete houses more accessible to more Jordanians. As 
the land in Yajouz was connected to infrastructure, zoned, and registered, 
it became a different kind of commodity. Most importantly, it became the 
kind of commodity that could be traded by global financial institutions. 
People began to build houses along Yajouz Road sometime in the 
1970s. The materials could be moved into place by vehicle. Residents 
could bring in generators for electricity and turn to a preexisting network 
of water trucks. Sewerage could be handled with septic tanks. Members 
of the Bani Hassan enthusiastically sold plots to all takers using a sale 
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contract (ḥujja) without the government deed (sanad), which has been re-
quired since the Ottoman tanzimat reforms. The Jordanian government 
objected vociferously to such sales, but the Bani Hassan were unrepen-
tant. They watched as tribesmen allied more closely with the regime in the 
western arable zone made millions selling land that was registered, zoned, 
and provisioned with water and electricity. Razzaz records one man who 
reasoned, “Islam tells us…if an unjust father treats his sons differently, 
feeding one and starving the other, the hungry son is permitted to seize 
his share, even if he has to steal it from his unjust father to survive. This is 
all we are doing” (1994:18).
When the government tried to demolish the houses of the Bani Hassan 
in 1983 to stop unregistered building by people who lacked legal title, the 
latter took up arms, shot at the security services, and burned their ve-
hicles. When tribesmen were rounded up, their families rioted outside the 
jail. Various attempts at reconciliation followed, and building and demoli-
tion continued, but with a new rule: if the roof was finished, the house was 
to be left intact. By 1985, the area was in the midst of a building boom. 
People would wait until Thursday afternoon when the police went home 
for the weekend. If they could finish the roof before the police returned, 
the authorities would generally not move forward with demolition. Razzaz 
reports that people clustered together, often based on kin ties or common 
place of origin. He gives the example of a “Hebron”18 community, which 
would take up a collection to bring in more gravel for their road every year. 
And, of course, Razzaz emphasizes the sense of security that living to-
gether engendered. Residents drew on the moral vocabulary of the host/
guest relationship. The “hosts” from the Bani Hassan made promises to 
continue to help the buyers defend their rights long after the sale had been 
made, although this was no substitute for the certainty that came with of-
ficial registration and title deed (sanad) in addition to the more traditional 
ḥujja or sale deed. One tribesman explained to Razzaz, “We do not think 
of a ḥujja as a regular sales contract. It is more like a marriage contract, 
binding both the buyer and seller for good” (1994:24). 
It would be wrong, however, to think that there was universal agreement 
on the nature of the problem. For the World Bank and their “squatter settle-
ment standardization program,” the problem was clearly one of property 
rights and the solution was to implement putatively apolitical initiatives of 
housing market “rationalization.” However, the indigenous planners always 
referred to the problem as one of sākin ‘ashwa’ī (chaotic housing), using a 
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word with no ostensible connection to property rights. For veterans of that 
era, the chief goals of the project had always been “straightening out the 
lines,” “widening the roads,” and “organizing things.” The property rela-
tions, central to the World Bank’s concerns were an afterthought for local 
planners who saw increasingly dense settlements with no signage, unreli-
able roads, and no services. The settlements were closed off and inscru-
table, and this worried employees at the HUDC.19 Razzaz, a future World 
Bank executive, is a sophisticated observer of both the Bank and indige-
nous officials, and captures traces of this divergent focus in his contempo-
raneous account. He reports that, “the situation was always described as 
chaotic, a ‘grave threat to law and order,’ a ‘potentially explosive situation 
where disputes between neighbors, heirs, and contesting claimants, could 
turn bloody and set the place on fire’” (1994:26–27). As a careful reading 
of Razzaz’s account of the stance taken by local officials makes clear, the 
issue of ownership was largely subordinated to that of public order, only 
arising where “contesting claimants” might “set the place on fire.”
It was into this breach that the World Bank stepped. With nearly every 
sector of Jordanian society (to say nothing of the international commu-
nity) increasingly accepting that the Palestinians were not leaving Jordan 
and would expand beyond the refugee camps and eventually fill in the 
space between Amman and Zarqa, the World Bank offered the following 
solution: the Jordanian government would take out a loan from the Bank, 
subdivide all of the plots in the squatter settlements, officially register the 
plots, provide some infrastructure (roads, water, and electricity), and then 
make the residents repay the loans. This would please many. The Bani 
Hassan could sell their land, the government created all sorts of jobs and 
opportunities for patronage, and, whether or not any given individual could 
pay back the loan, there was a delimited commodity asset that could be 
seized as collateral to either encourage repayment of the loan or to sell to 
clear the balance sheet. 
As another veteran of that era in the organization recalled, “it was 
great for everyone…except maybe the people who are still paying off 
the loans.” Particularly, from the government’s perspective, it reasserted 
the older Ottoman principle of the state’s prerogative in extracting some 
sort of fee from those who occupy land—here reformulated as principle 
and interest rather than a tax. Of course, from another perspective, this 
was the last land within physical reach of regular employment opportuni-
ties in the capital that was sheltered from global commodity markets due 
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to its questionable ownership, zoning status, and lack of infrastructure. 
Increasingly, Jordanians must compete in the same housing market as oil 
sheikhs, technocratic nouveau riche, hedge funds, and even their upper-
middle class neighbors who have high enough salaries to pay off a mort-
gage while still having enough money left over for food. 
Conclusion
Over the course of the past century, an ideal has emerged in Jordan which 
has valorized a certain kind of markedly masculine individual who could 
singlehandedly go out and earn the money necessary to provide for his 
household and, thereby, assume a highly qualified form of sovereign con-
trol over that household. In the process, the proliferation of wealth has 
seemingly gained importance in relationship to the proliferation of men. 
This has led, in turn, to the proliferation of a certain kind of man who could 
properly husband his wealth and his progeny as part of a long-term strat-
egy of accumulation. Of course, this type of control came from both male 
differential access to cash as well as male confidence in the state’s will-
ingness to defend their property—the true embodiment of sovereignty 
within contemporary Jordan. Such an arrangement was, in some ways, 
unprecedented. Many of the ties entailed by older notions of property rela-
tions were sundered. Housing became stationary and shifted from being 
women’s wealth (the goat hair tent) to men’s wealth (the immovable con-
crete house). Most notably, for the first time, large numbers of previously 
impoverished men suddenly discovered that they could afford to provide 
housing and food for their wives and obviate the necessity that the latter 
circulate through the community. In this, men like Abu Mahmud could as-
pire to partake in a classic pre-modern marker of nobility. 
As stated in the introduction, never once did Abu Mahmud tell me who 
his father and his friends had purchased the land from. A few times, when 
I impudently pressed the issue, he would scoff and exclaim, min nās (from 
people), with a dismissive wave of his hand. Categorically uninterested 
in explaining the finer points of the property transactions that legitimated 
these claims in the eyes of the Jordanian state, he focused on what he 
saw as truly key to ownership over the longue durée: the changing mas-
culine qualities of himself and his ancestors. He lionized the latter as “real 
men,” returning again and again to stories of his father, Sweilim, and his 
notorious forefather: 
The Proliferation of Men: Markets, Property, and Seizure in Jordan
1104
[His tribe] would go wherever they wanted. They bought [the area] 
from [another well-known tribe]. Those were the days of so-and-so 
Al-Aswad…He was a real man (rajul gadd-ḥālu). He was a Sheikh. 
He would take the hind leg of the lamb from every house. He was 
recognized by the Ottomans. He ruled over this whole area. He 
took a quarter of the goats. He would go from house to house and 
if they didn’t give him his right, he would make them thresh thistles 
[by walking barefoot on piles of thistles like donkeys separating 
wheat from chaff]. 
Such was the difference between his forefathers’ era—the era of real men 
(men the size of themselves)—and the more debased times in which we 
now lived, where men had grown comparatively soft and complacent. 
For Abu Mahmud, the buying and selling of the land (the relations be-
tween putative commodities) remained trivial compared to the relations 
between men. His agnates, in his account at least, could go wherever 
they wanted before the “sale” of the land in question. Even where land 
was “bought” it was the collective act of agnates relating to another group 
of agnates through at times violent confrontation. The salient historical 
precedent was a man who could command a hind leg from every house, 
the recognition of the area’s would-be Ottoman overlords, and the fear of 
anyone who did not want to be sadistically tortured in a cruel public spec-
tacle that reduced them to the status of an animal. 
At a time when there is little reason to believe housing will get any more af-
fordable, with the ongoing Syrian conflict and the emergence of the Za’atari 
and Azraq refugee camps as increasingly permanent settlements, one has 
to wonder if the role of seizure might begin to assert itself more forcefully in 
the coming years. A tenuous compromise between the dual imperatives of 
the proliferation of men and the proliferation of wealth, working in harmony 
for now, may see the aims of these two imperatives begin to diverge again. 
It remains to be seen if Abu Mahmud is correct in asserting that the prolifera-
tion of men is better than the proliferation of wealth. n
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E n d n o t e s :
1Mitchell’s “The Work of Economics” (2005) reminds us that economics and finance themselves have 
found this movement between center and periphery quite generative. He chronicles how the economist 
Hernando de Soto (2000) used a particular squatter settlement standardization program in Peru as a 
“natural experiment” to valorize liberal economics’ assumption that the extension of property rights is 
essential to development. In contrast, Mitchell argues that the putatively positive effects of the program 
uncovered by de Soto probably had more to do with the way the design of the studies interacted with the 
conclusion of Peru’s war with the Shining Path guerrilla movement and broader liberalization initiatives. In 
debunking de Soto’s findings, Mitchell offers a fascinating micro-history exemplifying how relatively pe-
ripheral communities can come to be central to the legitimation of the broader economic order, that order’s 
reliance on markets, and its peculiar sort of property regime. For a detailed account of the relationship 
between market-formation, conflicting social orders, and warfare in the longue durée, see Graeber (2011). 
2Tsing’s Friction (2004) offers one of the most compelling contemporary ethnographic accounts of the 
relationship between capitalism and violent resource extraction in frontier zones. 
3Zaloom’s (2006) vivid and widely-cited portrayal of the almost-exclusively male “open-outcry” traders 
who physically jostle in trading pits to make the best possible trade is a notable exception that nonethe-
less epitomizes the more general trend. Because the participants are rather well-remunerated and the 
actual commodities are so distant from the site of struggle, the violence involved is reduced to a quaint 
and abstract game that (in any event) is rapidly being replaced by new computer interfaces that demand 
an alternative form of bodily hexis that is almost completely sedentary.
4Lars Wahlin (1988, 1994) and Shryock (1997a) have questioned the degree to which Ottoman records can 
be trusted—where they still exist. For instance, Fischbach (2000:31) points out that the land records for 
southern Jordan were burned during an uprising in Karak in 1910. This implies that these records were not 
necessarily either irrelevant or uncontroversial. The case for the veracity of the later records is stronger, 
but there is probably a degree to which the British cadastral survey of the 1930s both reconfirmed the 
existing situation (cf. Shryock 1997a) but also became a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy. By simultaneously 
registering property to discrete individuals, effectively putting a stop to raiding and then distributing titles, 
government jobs, and education to many of those same individuals, the British probably tended to ossify 
social distinctions, labor relations, and property rights.
5Mitchell (2002) provides a detailed account of the British cadastral survey of Egypt in Chapter 2 
(“Principles True in Every Country”), which emphasizes similar sensibilities. 
6My neighbors would make a point of eating from these fruit trees when the opportunity presented itself. 
When doing so, they would remind me that, according to the sunna (the sayings and actions of the Prophet 
Muhammed), it is permissible to pick fruit from any fruit-bearing plant on anyone’s land as long as it is 
eaten immediately and not taken away.
7The apparent contradiction between Polanyi’s notion of land as a “fictitious” commodity and Appadurai 
(1988) and Kopytoff’s (1988) model of commoditization can be dispensed with so long as we treat the lat-
ter’s notion of “commodity candidacy” as a sort of conceptual limit that actual objects embedded in social 
relations can only approach asymptotically. 
8These planners moved between private consultancies, various ministries, the Housing Corporation, the 
Amman Municipality, the Housing Bank, USAID, and the World Bank.
9The official position of the Executive Summary of the National Housing Policy on the Palestinian Question 
deserves to be quoted at length: “Whether or not there is a resolution of the political question, refugee 
camps in urban areas at least, are clearly becoming permanent features of the housing stock. Government 
should therefore consider policies for upgrading refugee camps with the view that they will continue to 
function as permanent urban areas even if a large number of their present inhabitants were to leave” 
(Shelter Unit 1987a:32). What I find revealing here is the tenacity with which the Shelter Unit attempts to 
shield property relations from the contagion of “political questions.”
10The fact that the English-language reports were produced on 8.5” by 11” paper and not A4 always 
seemed emblematic of their foreignness. In fact, when I had finished with the 24-volume National Housing 
Strategy from 1987, a number of employees were curious to hear what was in it. 
11The way that the imposition of new property regimes renders the land involved in these moralizing tales 
far more valuable now than at any point in the past is central to how these stories appeal to the mix of envy, 
sour grapes, and Schadenfreude that makes them so much fun to both hear and tell.
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12This notion of rights being underwritten by agnatic kin groups observing a traditional code of “Bedouin 
Justice,” as opposed to an organized state, is central to the work of the anthropologist, former intelligence 
officer, and opposition politician Ahmad Oweidi Al-Abbadi (2006).
13The unreliability of interviewees was discussed extensively in Volume 9: “The Housing Suppliers 
Survey,” but, otherwise, the findings are generally reproduced without any caveats throughout the rest 
of the report.
14The moral logic is strikingly consonant with Sahlins’s (1972) “On the Sociology of Primitive Exchange.”
15Alon (2007) weaves together oral and textual evidence to provide a thorough account of conflicts which 
defined the relations between Jordanian and Saudi tribes during the British Mandate. 
16See Taussig (1977) on ill-gotten wealth that cannot bear fruit.
17Razzaz would later go on to teach at MIT and run the World Bank’s Lebanon office. 
18Hebron is the name of a longstanding Palestinian settlement that Jordan lost to Israel during the Six-day 
War in 1967.
19This is in keeping with a transnationally circulating planning discourse about the dangers of informality 
(cf. Holston 2007, Bayat 1997).
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